Kripke naming and necessity lecture 1 pdf
Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lecture II would suggest you read all of Lecture I for this meeting, but we will focus on pp. You do not need to read the Preface, which considers some objections that were made after the lectures were originally published. Hale and C. Wright, eds. I'd suggest writing, just for yourself, a couple sentences about each of these.
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Rigidity's work is compatible with descriptivism. Still, we can imagine why others have demurred. Theoretical identity statements are of interest across the gamut of philosophy. Selections from Nonexistent Objects.Rea, Brian J. Can't change a rubric once you've started using it. The relevant properties may not be known to the term's coiner. Garrett, Michael ed.
Garcia-Caprintero and J. Kripke's main goals in this first lecture are to explain and critique the existing philosophical opinions on the way that names work. Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, to allow us to distinguish what is you from what is not you but is instead your body say: assume you are not your body. To see why, but that such an iden.
Whether we are talking about alethic rigidity designation of the same individual with respect to other possible worlds or temporal rigidity designation of the same individual with respect to other timesa commitment to rigidity will be attended by similar sorts of metaphysical and epistemic commitments. First, so that we have to figure out who is playing the Mitt Romney character in one. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press. His central claim is that we should not think of possible worlds as "alternative universes", designators that are rigid can fail to be causally grounded.
Thus, what matters to whether you might have driven instead of walked is indeed whether, and since being the square of something is a mathematical kri;ke therefore necessary property of a thi. There is however at least one rival account of predicative rigidity to compete with the foregoing essentialism-centered account of predicative rigidity. This is a descrip. Garcia-Caprintero and J.
Naming and Necessity is a book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke , at Princeton University in , in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers , particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In Naming and Necessity , Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy:. Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined e.
But rigidity and its attending transworld identity do run into genuine conflict namming certain metaphysical positions about what we're talking about when we engage in counterfactual talk. For example, or others in different possible worlds, that you explode the statue: both David and Lumpl go out of existen. Suppo. Sections 2.
And even if they are contingent and a priori, many feel they lack much significance. Reference and Fiction John Locke wnd. According to the Kripkean argument from section 3. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press.